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RACISM AND BIOPOWER 
Ladelle McWhorter 
Introduction: Confusion and Silence 
While ignorance, or at least a lack of clear and distinct experience, does not 
seem to have stopped our predecessors from philosophizing about all manner 
of things from matter to immortal souls, in the latter half of the twentieth 
century North American philosophers became increasingly timid about 
advancing propositions based primarily not on logic informed by material 
evidence but on intuition, creative imagination, and passionate desire. By 
the 1960s our generation's teachers and mentors, perhaps battered by the 
McCarthy years or humbled by the dazzling successes of their colleagues in 
the "hard" sciences, had redrawn the disciplinary boundaries tightly enough 
to make almost any speculative work fall outside the realm of legitimate 
philosophy and into the realm ofliberal politics or sociology (read: soft-headed 
nonsense) or that of literature (read: girl stuff). In this way they sought to 
purifY and legitimate the discipline. Even still, at the beginning of the twenty-
first century, North American continentalists labor under and around these 
intellectual and institutional (and highly gender-coded) dividing practices 
and defensive barriers; much of our work is still considered by about 90 
percent of our Anglo-American philosophical contemporaries to be irrational 
poeticizing or manipulative politicizing. And of course in most circles our 
masculinity is still in serious doubt. 
Nevertheless, we carry on. We write about cultural and political issues; we 
take history seriously; we critique logic as well as social structures; and we 
often do so with unabashed passion. Some of us are avowed feminists, and 
a few are flagrantly female. Clearly we are willing to take some pretty big risks. 
So why is it that, until very recently, we have had so little to say about racism? 
Surely we have noticed it. We may have even suffered from it. Most likely we 
have abhorred it and denounced it on our campuses and in our communities. 
But with a few exceptions we have not written about it. Why not? 
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I can't answer for anybody but myself-and really I don't think I can 
explain myself terribly well either-but one reason, I think, is that I am 
deeply confused about racism and have been so virtually all my life, even 
while encountering and experiencing it daily. Michael Omi and Howard 
Winant suggest that most North Americans are similarly confused. "Since 
the ambiguous triumph of the civil rights movement in the mid-196os," 
they write, "clarity about what racism means has been eroding."1 Given 
their periodization, this process of conceptual erosion has been going on 
just about ever since I became aware of the world. I have never lived in a 
time when there was widespread agreement about what racism is. 
Prior to the mid-196os, Omi and Winant continue, "the problem of racial 
injustice and inequality was generally understood ... as a matter of preju-
diced attitudes or bigotry on the one hand, and discriminatory practices on 
the other" (69). But by the late 196os, a significant and widely observed 
theoretical shift had taken place. A large number of social critics, especially 
many within social justice movements, had begun to locate racism less in 
the individual psyche than in institutional structures: "Discrimination, far 
from manifesting itself only (or even principally) through individual actions 
or conscious policies, was a structural feature of U.S. society, the product of 
centuries of systematic exclusion, exploitation, and disregard of racially defined 
minorities" (69). While a structural conception perhaps better reflected some 
of the realities of the late twentieth century, the 1970s saw a neoconservative 
appropriation of the rhetoric of civil rights, and a concomitant return to the 
ideal of a color-blind society and to a conception of racism as injuries done 
to individuals by individuals. Given these twists and turns, by the 1990s, 
after thirty years of epistemological contestation, the concept of racism had 
entered what Omi and Winant term "an overall crisis of meaning .... Today, 
the absence of a clear 'common sense' understanding of what racism means 
has become a significant obstacle to efforts aimed at challenging it" (70). 
In fact, that absence is a significant obstacle to thinking systematically 
about race and racism at all. It is difficult to philosophize about something 
if you don't know what it is. Not that such ignorance gives us permission 
not to try, but it does make the job a lot more difficult and daunting than 
it might otherwise be. Couple the enormity of the undertaking itself with 
the professional risks of venturing into a relatively uncharted philosophical 
terrain and the emotional risks of closely examining phenomena that have 
shaped and scarred us all since early life, and you may have a partial answer 
to why so few of us have made much of an attempt. The prospect is just 
plain scary. 
RACISM AND B!OPOWER 57 
There is a further reason as well, I think, which is that by definition 
continental philosophers focus on European philosophy, mostly European 
philosophy produced in the twentieth century. We rarely philosophize 
about anything without a text to depart from (or, more often, to stay right 
with, reading closely), a text authored by someone with either a French or a 
German last name. So we end up more or less stuck discussing the topics 
those people thought were important. Not very many of them had anything 
at all to say about racism in North America. As long as we let our texts set 
the agenda, we probably won't have a whole lot to say about it either. 
In the next section of this chapter, I will briefly examine some of the 
very few "canonical" twentieth-century continental texts that do deal with 
racism, namely, some works by Sartre, Horkheimer, and Adorno. I will argue 
that these analyses are inadequate for thinking through North American 
racism and the concept of race operative here. Then I will tum my attention 
to some texts-especially two late works by Michel Foucault-that do not 
directly address North American racism but, I believe, hold a great deal of 
promise for such a project. I will examine part V of The History of Sexuality, 
vol. I, An Introduction and several chapters of "Society Must Be Deftnded"2 in 
conjunction with works by U.S. historians to give a sketch of a genealogy of 
Anglo-American racism. I will contend that cultivating a genealogical awareness 
of the racism that shapes our society and our selves is a powerful beginning on 
the way toward diminishing our confusion about race and racism, and, even 
more important, toward overcoming our racist culture and our racist selves. 
Continental Resources: Some Philosophers with French and German 
Last Names Who Did Write About Racism in North America 
Jean-Paul Sartre is an apparent exception to the resounding European silence 
on the issue of racism. His most systematic philosophical exploration of 
bigotry is his Anti-Semite and jew (first published in France in 1946 under 
the title Rejlexions sur la question juive). This very readable volume offers a 
provocative analysis of the existential psychology of anti-Semitism as a personal 
choice rooted in a bad faith disavowal of the human condition of radical 
freedom. Unfortunately; in the end it does not tell us much about racism. 
Sartre writes, "For the anti-Semite, what makes the Jew is the presence in him 
of 'Jewishness,' a Jewish principle analogous to phlogiston or the soporific 
virtue of opium. We must not be deceived: explanations on the basis of heredity 
and race came later; they are the slender scientific coating of this primitive 
5 8 ON RACE AND RACISM IN AMERICA 
conviction."3 Anti-Semitism is a reifying strategy; it is a way of making the 
world be still, of keeping everyone in his or her carefully delineated place 
so that new circumstances will not arise in which new choices will have to 
be made. Sartre writes: "The existence of the Jew merely permits the anti-
Semite to stifle his anxieties at their inception by persu~ding himself that 
his place in the world has been marked out in advance, that it awaits him, 
and that tradition gives him the right to occupy it. Anti-Semitism, in short, 
is fear of the human condition. The anti-Semite is a man who wishes to be 
pitiless stone, a furious torrent, a devastating thunderbolt-anything except 
a man" (54). The underlying issue is not anti-Semitism, then, or even racism 
in general; it is bad faith. 
Sartre did produce some work on antiblack racism in the United States, 
which one might think would be of more help to U.S. continental philoso-
phers. Since he claims that antiblack racism, too, is a but another line of 
flight from freedom, one of the many apparently interchangeable guises of 
bad faith rather than a phenomenon to be studied in itself, however, his 
descriptions of the U.S. situation offer no more insight than what we can 
glean from Anti-Semite and jew. As Julien Murphy has pointed out in her 
essay "Sartre on American Racism," Sartre fails to develop any analysis that 
gets at what is particular about racism in the United States.4 Even when 
writing on horrific housing conditions in Chicago's black ghettos, Sartre 
does not distinguish racism from any other form of oppression; instead, he 
subsumes African Americans into the international proletariat and insists 
that the interests of African Americans are identical with the interests of 
workers in a socialist revolution;5 racism is just an outgrowth of capitalism.6 
Thus, strangely enough, using Sartre's work to understand racism very 
quickly leads us away from any analysis of racism. Racism as a primary 
object of inquiry dissolves in a critique of capitalism and of individual sub-
jectivity in bad faith.7 
A similar limitation characterizes another apparent exception to Euro-
pean philosophers' silence on the issue of race, namely, Horkheimer and 
Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment, together with the Frankfurt School's 
massive empirical study The Authoritarian Personality (authored by Adorno 
and others). Whereas Sartre maintains that the motive for anti-Semitism 
and racism is the fear of radical freedom and the responsibility it entails (it 
is a kind of metaphysical cowardice), the Frankfurt School authors take a 
less moralistic tack, holding that the motive is merely the satisfaction of certain 
psychological needs. 8 These two accounts could be reconciled, though, if we 
construe "need" to include the desire to conceal from oneself one's feelings 
RACISM AND BIOPOWER 59 
of fear and inadequacy in the face of what Sartre calls "the human condition." 
That done, the two descriptions are remarkably similar. Both accounts take 
anti-Semitism to be the most prevalent and virulent form of bigotry in the 
modem West, but both construe anti-Semitism as just a particular version of 
a more general phenomenon that is, or includes, all forms of racism. Thus, 
according to the Frankfurt theorists, an analysis based on anti-Semitism 
should be adequate to account for antiblack racism as well. Say the authors of 
The Authoritarian Personality, "Evidence from the present study confirms 
what has often been indicated: that a man who is hostile toward one minority 
group is very likely to be hostile against a wide variety of others" (Adorno et 
al., 9). And as Horkheimer and Adorno assert in Dialectic of Enlightenment, 
"It is not so much that such people react originally against the Jews as that 
their drive-structure has developed a tendency toward persecution which the 
ticket [meaning the party in power] then furnishes with an adequate object."9 
In other words, anti-Semitism is an expression of a kind of personality under 
certain social conditions; under other social conditions that same kind of 
personality would express itself in antiblack racism, hatred of Mexicans or 
Arabs, or even hatred of homosexuals or Catholics (Adorno et al., 142-45). 
Hence, like Sartre's analysis, that of the Frankfurt School turns out on 
dose inspection not to be an analysis of racism per se. In fact, chapter 4 of The 
Authoritarian Personality critiques the very concept of "race," asserting that it 
is inadequate for any classification of human beings (Adorno et al., 103); 
instead of "racism," therefore, this critical study addresses itself to "ethno-
centrism." To be ethnocentric means "to be rigid in [one's] acceptance of the 
culturally 'alike' and in [one's] rejection of the 'unlike"' (Adorno et al., 102). 
The concept of ethnocentrism represents an improvement over the concept 
of racism, we are told, in that it enables study not only of race hatreds but also 
of hatred directed toward groups not classifiable as races under any schema; 
the text mentions zoot-suiters and Okies in particular. Once again, the frame-
work offered does not purport to be a framework for analyzing racism, except 
insofar as racism is a symptom of or a disguise for something else. 
These analyses share many assumptions with what Omi and Winant 
term the pre-civil rights era view ofracism, wherein racism was under-
stood as a function of individual action and belief-individual prejudice 
against and deliberate mistreatment of other individuals. Both analyses 
focus on subjectivity as the locus of racism and the appropriate focus of 
opposition to it. This attention to subjectivity is typical, of course, not only 
of understandings of racism in the first half of the twentieth century but 
also of European philosophy in general. Phenomenology-out of which 
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Sartrean existentialism comes-is all about subjectivity as the ground on 
which sense is to be made of the world. It is a legitimate heir to Hegel, 
Kant, and Descartes. So it should come as no surprise to us that this strain of 
continental philosophy would founder in the face of the kinds of structural 
analyses of racism that began to come out of the Black Power movement, for 
example, by the late 196os. Nor is it any surprise that philosophical Marxism, 
which one might think could help generate structural analyses, also failed 
to produce an analysis of racism that did not dissolve it in a more generic 
global struggle for economic ascendancy. 
This leaves continental philosophers in the United States facing an enor-
mous issue without clearly applicable philosophical models. We who are so 
unremittingly textual in our orientation-who can barely utter a sentence 
without a European author's name attached-find ourselves on a distinctly 
American frontier without a legible map. Nevertheless, I don't think we are 
completely without continental resources-just not models or theoretical 
frameworks premade for use in our geopolitical context. I want to use the 
rest of the space allotted to me here to make a case for the importance of 
Foucault's thought for the work we have to do. 
Race and History 
History shows no shortage of group-based animosity. People have hated 
other people and have gone so far as to torture and massacre them in droves 
for all sorts of reasons-their religion, their morals, the language they 
spoke, because they were Saracens or Croats or Romans or damn Yankees 
or vagabonds or infidels. The point was they just weren't us, and they had 
something we wanted or posed a threat to us either materially or psycho-
logically. To call all these phenomena instances of racism, it seems to me, 
would be to dilute the meaning of the term wantonly, without any concep-
tual gain. Whatever racism is, it has something to do with whatever it is that 
we call race. Where there is no concept of race, where differences between 
people are not identified as racial differences, animosity, hatred, oppression, 
and genocide might be very bad things, but they are not racist. 
The first known use .of the term race in English occurred in 1508; it, like 
its French and German equivalents, derives from the Italian razza, which 
is not much older.10 Thus, given my stipulation that group animosities not 
rooted in racial divisions are not racisms-even if their adherents point to 
morphological traits as indicative of group membership-whatever racism 
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is, it did not exist among English-speaking peoples any earlier than the six-
teenth century. 
Nevertheless, racism did not necessarily come into existence when the 
concept of race did. The concept of race is no more essentially racist than 
the concept of sex is essentially sexist. On the contrary, early uses of the 
term race are so different from familiar racist uses of the word that it is very 
unlikely that the concept was first used as a tool for making broad and 
unjust political, economic, or moral distinctions among human beings. In 
the sixteenth century, the term race occurs most often in reference to groups 
of animals and plants-what we might call subspecies, breeds, strains, or 
varieties. There is no clear scientific definition until the late eighteenth 
century. This very early use of the term persists in present-day bird-watching 
manuals. Robert Burton, writing for the National Audubon Society in 1999, 
elaborates on his description of the Northern Flicker: "There are three 
races, showing variations in color under the wings and tail. The red-shafted, 
west of the Rockies, has red, and the gilded flicker, of the southwest, is 
golden. The yellow-shafted, east of the Rockies, has yellow, with red on the 
back of the head, and a black mustache."11 I have no reason to think that 
Mr. Burton holds one or another of these races of birds to be inferior or 
superior, insofar as they are red-shafted, yellow, or golden, mustachioed or 
clean-shaven. Nor is there reason to believe that the birds have established 
some sort of racist hierarchy among themselves or hold one another in 
racist contempt. As this example shows, classification of beings into races 
is not necessarily a racist practice. Presumably that could be true even if the 
beings so classified were human, as they were in the English-speaking 
world by 158o.U Only after 1580 did the concept of race somehow enable or 
begin to play a role in practices that most people would call racist. Clearly 
racism, whatever it is, is not a natural phenomenon, an ahistorical given; 
racism emerges in history. 
European philosophers of the twentieth century may have neglected to 
say much about racism, but they have had a lot to say about history and the 
historicity of things often taken to be ahistorical. Accordingly, insofar as we 
take racism to be a historical phenomenon, we continentalists may be in a 
very good position to develop some understanding of it. Foucault's thought 
stands out in this regard, both because he produced so much work that 
investigates the concrete genealogies of cultural realities-like mental illness, 
criminality, sexuality, and so forth- thus giving us a set of tools for under-
taking such investigations ourselves, and because he actually did some work 
on the history of European racisms himself, most notably in part V of The 
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History of Sexuality, vol. 1, An Introduction (1978) and in his 1976lecture series 
at the College de France, "Society Must Be Defended" (2003). I will spend the 
rest of this chapter exploring the use of these works as a basis for developing 
a genealogical account of modem racism in the United States. 
Raciality as a Dispositif 
Foucault tells a genealogical story about racial discourse that begins in Eng-
land around 1630, fifty years after the concept of race began to be used to 
classify groups of human beings. Foucault's is a story not of racism but 
rather, as he terms it, of race war. The story goes like this: Various factions in 
English society, principally those more or less disempowered and humiliated 
by what they called the Norman government of James I, claimed that the 
Stuart monarchy was illegitimate. Oppressed by a king and court that had 
blood and religious ties to a foreign country and that conducted state affairs 
in a foreign language, a self-proclaimed Saxon underclass began to speak of 
themselves as an indigenous race aligned against a race of conquering 
aliens.U The laws these aliens brought with them and imposed were not a 
means to peace (as laws are allegedly supposed to be) but a weapon of continued 
subjugation of the general populace, the rightful inhabitants of the land. What 
underlay and pervaded all of seventeenth-century English society, according to 
these thinkers and rebels, was war-"basically, a race war" (Foucault, 2003, 
6o), one that had been ongoing since 1066.H 
Thus the concept of race as race war emerges in the English-speaking 
world, Foucault maintains, first as a means oflocating and underlining the 
existence of ongoing and egregious injustice. It surfaces among the Puritans, 
circulates irt modified form among the Parliamentarians, and erupts in the 
demands of the Diggers and Levellers. In each case, different though they 
may be, it operates as a wedge for separating the people from the sovereign, 
the better to lay hold of an alternative conception of the nation, not as the 
sovereign's property but as a kind of popular hereditary home. The concept 
of race thus makes its first explicitly political appearance not on the side of 
a powerful oppressor group but on the side of the oppressed. It enables a 
counterhistory. It rallies a people for revolutionary action. 
This is decidedly not the same discursive formation that supported the bio-
logistic conceptions of race that circulated in the twentieth century: "Although 
this discourse speaks of races, and although the term 'race' appears at a very 
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early stage, it is quite obvious that the word 'race' itself is not joined to a stable 
biological meaning" (Foucault, 2003, 77). Instead of groups of different 
types of bodies with different capacities for development, race at this time 
typically named groups that differed in language and religion; it was therefore 
allied with lineage, ritual, and custom, but was not essentially determined by 
heredity or necessarily marked by morphological traits. Race did not mean 
in 1630 what it came to mean in the nineteenth century and what it often 
still means now. Nor was racial animosity and hatred the same phenomenon 
as our post-Darwinian racism. That is not to say, however, that the discourse 
of race war was solely the property of the downtrodden: "It should in fact be 
immediately obvious that it is a discourse that has a great ability to circulate, a 
great aptitude for metamorphosis, or a sort of strategic polyvalence" (Foucault, 
2003, 76). The discourse of race war was a wonderful way, in all kinds of polit-
ical contexts, for distinguishing between "us" and "them." Once invented, it 
was available as a means for rallying forces for reactionary as well as revolu-
tionary acts of expulsion or extermination of those deemed alien ("them"). It 
was used by just about everybody. Foucault goes on to trace the career of race 
war discourse in transmuted form in late seventeenth-century France among 
an aristocracy battling both a tyrannical monarch and a rising underclass. But 
we need not examine that history here, since our concern is with the genealogy 
of racism in Anglo-America. 
It should be an easy matter for historians to trace the migration of race 
war discourse from England to the Anglo-American colonies. Although the 
Plymouth Puritans arrived in New England before 1630, plenty of English 
dissenters found themselves in the "New World" after the discourse became 
current in England; they would have heard the racial rallying cries before 
they got on the boat. During Cromwell's rule in the 165os, Puritan factions 
held power in a number of American colonial governments, including Vir-
ginia and Maryland.15 After the Restoration of the Stuart monarchy in 166o, 
Charles II sent a number of Cromwellians into bond-servitude in the Virginia 
colony.16 Since Anglo-America was a handy repository for royal enemies, it is 
quite likely that a great many of the "settlers" (most of them chattel bond-
laborers) in Virginia and elsewhere were well acquainted with the dissenter 
rhetoric of race war between the Saxons and the Norman usurpers.17 
Beyond giving a voice to seething resentment toward the Stuart king who 
bound and exiled his enemies to the malarial marshlands of the Chesapeake, 
however, such a discourse might have had little application in colonial territo-
ries like Maryland, Virginia, and Carolina. Who, after all, was being conquered 
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there? Clearly not the Saxons. There it was native peoples who were placed 
under laws that operated more like weapons against them or were killed or 
sold by the thousands into slavery in the colonies of the Caribbean. The Puritan 
discourse of race war does not seem especially applicable, except possibly in 
reverse. Therefore it does not seem to have given rise in any direct way to the 
racial discourses that eventually came to characterize the incipient United 
States of America. Benjamin Franklin's and Thomas Jefferson's racial dis-
courses are not reminiscent that of seventeenth-century dissenter race war; 
the concept of race itself had undergone significant change by their time, and 
they write from out of a very different political milieu. 18 What happened, and 
what differences did it make? 
According to Foucault, there are two major points of historical transfor-
mation in racial discourse on the European continent after the seventeenth 
century. The first is what he calls "an openly biological transition," when race 
becomes a biological concept. This occurs in the latter half of the eighteenth 
century and reaches full articulation very early in the nineteenth. Foucault 
correlates this move-which he sees as politically highly ambiguous-with 
"nationalist movements in Europe and with nationalities' struggles against 
the great State apparatuses (essentially the Russian and the Austrian)," and 
with eighteenth-century policies of colonization (2003, 6o). I would venture 
to say that it is highly likely that Anglo-Americans participated fully in this 
development, possibly influencing Europeans' thinking as much as European 
thinking influenced theirs, and certainly helping to create the concepts and 
theories from which later Americans would draw. Anglo-Americans had a 
lot to gain from reworking the concept of race and using it to divide an often-
rowdy population into distinct groups according to both custom and law. I 
doubt they waited to follow European trends, even if they did eventually incor-
porate a great deal of European racial thinking into their own. 
Historian Theodore Allen's 1997 work The Invention of the White Race is 
very suggestive along these lines. He argues that the "white race" was a North 
American invention of the eighteenth century, to a great extent deliberately 
produced by a capitalist elite as a means of controlling a rebellious labor force 
made up of bond-laborers from all over the world. Allen marshals pages and 
pages of evidence to show that the colonial labor force was in fact extremely 
rebellious and prone to act with solidarity across what we now perceive as 
raciallines.19 He documents numerous examples of European and African 
bond-laborers escaping their masters together, many of them running for 
asylum to neighboring native communities that sheltered and eventually 
RACISM AND BIOPOWER 6 5 
incorporated them. Many planters found it necessary to separate European 
and African bond-laborers from native slaves (and many objected to having 
native laborers at all, preferring to sell them to dealers for shipment out of 
the colony), because the natives, with their knowledge of the local geography 
and environment, were apt to be successful at escaping into the hinterland 
and frequently took their European and African comrades along. 20 There are 
also many examples of seventeenth-century resistance to individual masters, 
and to bond-servitude in general, where European and African laborers coop-
erated with one another without any apparent racist discord. Allen's central 
example of this is Bacon's Rebellion in the Virginia Colony in 1676, wherein 
hundreds of bond-laborers of both European and African descent united, 
took up arms, and fought to destroy the institution of chattel slavery in the 
Virginia ColonyY 
Unlike production of sugar in the colonies of the Caribbean, which required 
a lot of capital for equipment and a highly skilled labor force, production of 
tobacco required little more than land and hands. Anyone who could get 
land and force enough people to work for him could, theoretically, get rich. 
But if the hands came as indentured servants to whom land was owed after 
a certain number of years of servitude (and if those indentured servants 
actually lived longer than their term of service, which rarely happened in the 
first decades of the Virginia Colony), the number oflandowners among whom 
tobacco profits had to be shared would grow (because tlie price would drop as 
production increased), and the number of people available to use as laborers 
would decrease. Lifelong bond-servitude looked like a good solution from 
the perspective of propertied profit seekers; if bond-laborers were never set 
free, no freedom dues (land and tools) would be owed and the cost of labor 
would stay at a minimum (com mash and an occasional suit of clothes). Allen 
shows that there were many attempts on the part of Virginia landowners to 
reduce tlieir European labor force to the status of chattel slaves, and in many 
instances they succeeded. But these efforts were clearly out of keeping with 
British law and difficult to reconcile with emerging classical liberal political 
principles. Once the British chartered the Royal Africa Company in 1667 to 
exploit their newly acquired direct access to African coasts following the 
Second Anglo-Dutch War, it was much easier to enforce lifelong servitude 
on laborers with no indenture papers and no ties to European governments 
that might protect their rights or interests. Why fight with the authorities 
over the status of European laborers when the same work could be wrung 
out of people with no government to protect their interests? 
66 ON RACE AND RACISM IN AMERICA 
Still, if European bond-laborers or small-claims freedmen identified 
with the plight of the African life-term bond-laborer or understood their 
economic interests to be compromised by the rise of this source of cheap 
labor, 22 elite capitalist control of the population would remain very difficult. 
Hence, Allen argues, the colonial government in the tobacco colonies, and 
later the U.S. government as an extension of those colonial governments, 
deliberately sought to drive an ideological wedge between African American 
laborers and those whose ancestors came from European lands. They did this 
by more or less systematically degrading not chattel slaves but free Africans 
and African Americans through legal and economic means, while setting up a 
contrasting and higher legal status for European Americans. The legal code of 
Virginia was revised in 1705, at which time the General Assembly created a 
number of new laws to lower the status of free African Americans and simul-
taneously raise the status of European American bond-servants. More such 
laws were enacted over the next two decades, and Allen notes that not only did 
these laws change the status of free African Americans from its previous level 
of civil equality with free European Americans, but, further, "the ruling class 
took special pains to be sure that the people they ruled were propagandized in 
the moral and legal ethos of white-supremacism." Allen continues: 
For consciousness-raising purposes (to prevent "pretense ofignorance"), 
the laws mandated that parish clerks or churchwardens, once each 
spring and fall at the close of Sunday service, should read ("publish") 
these laws in full to the congregants. Sheriffs were ordered to have the 
same done at the courthouse door at the June or July term of court. If we 
presume, in the absence of any contrary record, that this mandate was 
followed, we must conclude that the general public was regularly and 
systematically subjected to official white-supremacist agitation. It was to 
be drummed into the minds of the people that, for the first time, no free 
African-American was to dare to lift his or her hand against a "Christian, 
not being a negro, mulatto, or Indian" (3:459); that African-American 
freeholders were no longer to be allowed to vote (4:133-34); that the pro-
vision of a previous enactment (3:87 [1691)) was being reinforced against 
the mating of English and Negroes as producing "abominable mixture" 
and "spurious issue" (3:453-54); that, as provided in the 1723law for pre-
venting freedom plots by African-American bond-laborers, "any white 
person ... found in company with any [illegally congregated] slaves" was 
to be fined (along with free African-Americans or Indians so offending) 
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with a fine of fifteen shillings, or to "receive, on his, her, or their bare 
backs, for every such offense, twenty lashes well laid on" (4:129).23 
If European Americans already considered African Americans their inferi-
ors, already discriminated against them by custom socially and economically, 
and already disdained their company and ignored their interests and needs, 
why would such laws have been enacted and why would such care have been 
taken to make sure European Americans were reminded of their existence 
three times per year? Why were these actions taken if not to divide an as-yet 
undivided working class in such a way as to cripple or preclude at the outset 
any movement that might challenge the rich planters' control? For the colonial 
capitalists' purposes it was necessary; Allen argues, not just to enslave African 
Americans for their entire lives and bind their children into life-term servitude 
as well, but also to convince European Americans to tolerate a system that ran 
counter to their English traditions, their emotional ties, and their economic 
interests, and even to help uphold it by keeping surveillance over slave popula-
tions and taking up arms to defend the planters against African American 
rebellions. "Thus," Allen concludes: 
was the "white race" invented as the social control formation whose dis-
tinguishing characteristic was not the participation of the slaveholding 
class, nor even of other elements of the propertied classes; that alone 
would have been merely a form of the "beautiful gradation" of class 
differentiation prescribed by Edmund Burke. What distingUished this 
system of social control, what made it "the white race," was the partici-
pation of the laboring classes: non-slave-holders, self-employed small-
holders, tenants, and laborers. In time this "white race" social control 
system begun in Virginia and Maryland would serve as the model of 
social order to each succeeding plantation region of settlement. 24 
The white race was thus an element in what Foucault could call a dispositif, a 
vast institutionalized apparatus of power. Its creation was not masterminded 
by one small group of people or brought into existence by one official act, but 
rather was a historical creation that served a great many confluent interests. 
Racial whiteness, a form of embodiment, became a form of subjectivity-
a form of citizenship, a form of social status, and a form of personal identity 
in North America over the course of the eighteenth century. Whereas earlier 
racial discourse tended to emphasize lineage and language above physical 
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appearance, now physical appearance was paramount. And whereas before 
racism might consist in animosity or violence among races, now it tended to 
consist in universalized hierarchical rankings and the oppression that such 
rankings were deemed to justifY. By the late eighteenth century, race had 
become something much more like a biological concept. 
Still, as Foucault points out and as many other writers have as well, until 
the nineteenth century race was not a salient scientific concept. While race had 
a kind of quasi-biological existence outside the science of biology, it did not 
become a significant category for biologists, and for political discourses osten-
sibly predicated on biology, until a bit later. And, according to Foucault, this 
development, when it occurred, enabled the creation of what he calls "state 
racism," the most extreme form of which is exemplified in the Third Reich. 
Foucault maintains that this second transformation in the concept of 
race emerges in nineteenth-century Europe just as popular discourse of 
class struggle begins to supplant race discourse altogether. I think this part 
of his European story diverges somewhat from the account we would have 
to give of the career of race in North America, but before addressing that 
issue, I will simply recount Foucault's narrative. 
Foucault asserts, "At the time when the notion of race struggle was 
about to be replaced by that of class struggle ... it was in fact only natural 
that attempts should be made by one side to recode the old counterhistory 
not in terms of class, but in terms of races-races in the biological and 
medical sense of that term" (Foucault, 2003, 8o). To retain control over their 
labor forces and to reassert their power and moral authority, the ruling 
classes developed their own racial counterdiscourse (in opposition to the 
discourse of race war and to the emerging discourse of class struggle), but 
their reactionary version stripped racial discourse of its historical dimension 
and its emphasis on battles and conquests, substituting a "postrevolutionist 
theme of struggle for existence ... the differentiation of species, natural 
selection, and the survival of the fittest species" (8o). From that time on, as 
Foucault points out, European nations were not conceived as divided into 
two (or more) conflicting groups with different lineages, languages, and 
laws, but rather as one biological entity, one body, threatened in its biological 
continuity by heterogeneous elements that must be purged to maintain its 
health and insure its survival: "Hence the idea that foreigners have infiltrated 
this society, the theme of the deviants who are this society's by-products" 
(8r). These people, both alien "germs" and indigenous "cancers," had to be 
identified and eliminated before the contamination they constituted could 
weaken and destroy "our" society. 
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In the earlier European discourses of race war, the state was seen as the 
enemy of justice, the weapon in the ongoing war of the alien conquerors 
over the native race. In this new European discourse of race as biological 
contamination, "the State is no longer an instrument that one race uses 
against another: the State is, and must be, the protector of the integrity, the 
superiority, and the purity of the race" (8r). This is a ruling class discourse, 
then, one that could only be perpetrated by a group already in control of the 
state apparatus and ready to use it to contain and neutralize their enemies. 
This is where Foucault locates the origin of modem racism: "I think that 
racism is born at the point when the theme of racial purity replaces that of 
race struggle .... At the moment when the discourse of race struggle was 
being transformed into revolutionary discourse [meaning, here, something 
like a Marxist discourse of class struggle], the revolutionary project and revo-
lutionary propheticism now began to take a very different direction. Racism 
is, quite literally, revolutionary discourse in an inverted form" (8r). It is this 
racial discourse-that of the state's imperative to purify the race of the con-
taminants that threaten its biological existence and continued viability in a 
post-Darwinian world-that leads to fascism, elements of which persist in 
every modem nation-state throughout the twentieth century. 
This is Foucault's genealogy of race and racism. The story begins in England 
in r63o, where race is conceived nonbiologically in terms oflanguage,lineage, 
law; and conquest. The discourse undergoes a transformation as it becomes 
part of a biological discourse in the late eighteenth century, and then a further 
transformation when that biological discourse becomes a tool in the hands 
of capitalists and state officials in the nineteenth century who seek control 
over national populations, especially laborers. I will leave it to students of 
European history to examine the details of this account. My concern is with 
North America, where history unfolds somewhat differently. 
Speculations on the Genealogy of Race in North America 
Foucault, as was said above, sees two shifts in European racial discourse 
after its inception as race war. First there is the shift in the meaning of the 
term race from a loose designation of cultural affiliation to a description of 
heritable morphology. This occurs in the late eighteenth century, according 
to Foucault, and subsequent scholarship has suggested that it may achieve its 
most systematic expression in the work of Immanuel Kant between 1775 and 
1788.25 Second is the incorporation of race into biological science, eugenic 
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policy, and technology beginning in the mid-nineteenth century. In this latter 
move the idea of race as heritable morphology is incorporated into a bio-
logical science that emphasizes function and development over anatomy 
and structure. In this new context, heritable race encompasses not only 
physical appearance (and not even necessarily that) but also characteristic 
physiological processes and functions, including sexuality, cognitive devel-
opment, and vulnerability to degenerative disease. 
In work that predates his study of race by at least a decade, Foucault 
described the advent of biological science at the very beginning of the nine-
teenth century. Biology, he maintains, eclipses its older rival natural history 
when scientists first isolate and define the concept "life" as an object of 
study. Natural historians gave accounts of plants and animals that focused 
on the visible body, the appearance and architecture of entities. Some, like 
linnaeus, were interested in classifYing beings as like or unlike other beings 
in form. Others, like Kant (who was primarily a geographer rather than a 
natural historian), insisted on taking history seriously as the medium in 
which form arises, but still the accounts produced concentrated on visual 
appearances or structural forms. As Foucault put it, "The naturalist is the 
man concerned with the structure of the visible world and its denomination 
according to characters. Not with life."26 Life, as biologists began to under-
stand it, was in effect process; it was the process of material assimilation and 
growth, the process of reproduction, the process of aging and deterioration, 
even the process of death. living beings were organisms made up of functional 
systems whose processes were both cyclic (like respiration and digestion) 
and longitudinal (like sexual maturation). Organisms do not simply exist; 
they develop, and eventually decay. 
These processes that, taken together, make up life can be normed-that 
is, their speed and trajectories can be measured and data compiled so that it 
becomes possible to say what rate and type of development is normal in a 
given type of organism. For example, on average female human beings 
become fertile between (say) ten and fifteen years of age. A girl who reaches 
menarche at seven or at twenty is unusual; her development deviates from the 
norm, and she can be classified as abnormal in a certain specifiable degree. 
The nineteenth century ushered in an age of statistics wherein virtually every 
phenomenon is normalized, every event rendered knowable by means of its 
degree of deviation from some norm. 
As this new scientific life began to operate as an organizing principle in 
an ever-widening circle of theoretical undertakings, European racial theories 
underwent alteration. No longer was race simply an observable morphological 
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phenomenon that might (or might not) signify a metaphysical difference; 
race became a mark of deviance explicable in terms of the process of human 
development, the development of civilizationY There was only one normal 
developmental path from savagery to civilization. Some human groups 
were either dallying along that path-retarded in their development-or 
had deviated from it and were either permanently arrested at a primitive 
stage or retrogressing toward savagery. Everyone who was not a ___ _ 
(depending on the theorist, in this blank would be written English, Saxon, 
Caucasian, Aryan, etc.) was either a racial retard or a racial degenerate. Either 
way. race had become, inherently. a matter of both hierarchy and health. 
We see the same two major trends in racial discourse in Anglo-America. 
The first shift may have occurred somewhat more rapidly in the tobacco 
colonies, predating Kant's work certainly and even influencing it-particu-
larly his changing conception of the racial status of native North Americans 
between 1775 and 1785. (Kant insists in his earlier work that Americans do 
not constitute a fully formed race but are the imperfectly adapted progeny 
of "Hunnish"-he also calls them Mongol or Kalmuck-peoples once living 
in northeastern Asia. In his later work, he holds the Americans to be a separate 
"red" race, distinct from the "yellow" races of the East. This change may have 
come as a result of reading Anglo-American sources, since the idea that 
Native Americans are red apparently originated with Native Americans 
themselves or within verbal encounters between them and Anglo-Americans; 
in fact, Native Americans do not have red skin, and no Anglo-American 
spoke of natives as red before the 172os.28) Whatever the conceptual status 
of the morphological concept of race in North America relative to Europe, 
it is clear that Anglo-Americans were far more willing much earlier to use 
morphological race as the basis of political dividing practices. In 1723 the 
Virginia General Assembly passed "an Act directing the trial of Slaves, 
committing capital crimes; and for the more effectual punishing conspiracies 
and insurrections of them; and for the better government of Negroes, 
Mulattos, and Indians, bond or free." Shortly thereafter, British attorney 
general Richard West made inquiry as to why free Negroes, mulattoes, and 
Native Americans were to have no right to vote in any election in the colony, a 
clear departure from English law and from previous colonial statutes. West 
wrote, "I cannot see why one freeman should be used worse than another, 
merely upon account of his complexion.''29 Colonial governor William Gooch 
explained that free Negroes and mulattoes would undoubtedly remain sym-
pathetic to slaves-as they apparently had in a recent slave uprising-and 
thus must have affixed to them "a perpetual Brand ... by excluding _them 
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from that great Privilege of a Freeman."30 It should be noted that Gooch 
evinces no small amount of class consciousness when he points out that 
mulattoes in particular were troublesome, "as most of them are the Bastards 
of some of the worst of our imported Servants and Convicts." Race (or a sort 
of ingrained or habitual racism) was obviously not the fundamental reason 
for racial distinction in law, according to Gooch; the fundamental reason was 
political and strategic. Because of their personal histories and affiliations, 
such people simply could not be trusted to act as loyal subjects of the Crown. 
Th~ easiest way to contain them was to create law that marked their race 
as an underclass. Thus was the morphological concept of race shaped and 
extended more or less deliberately through the mechanism of coloniallaw.31 
Pigmentation was the premiere morphological mark of race, replacing 
the older conception of race as cultural or linguistic affiliation and lineage, 
although obviously pigmentation was believed to be heritable and thus a 
concomitant oflineage. There were certainly other morphological consid-
erations, such as head shape, hair color and texture, and facial features. But 
pigmentation was the easiest to see at a distance, which was important in 
tracking fugitive servants and slaves and spotting hostile natives. For the 
most part, then, in Anglo-America pigmentation was paramount; it was the 
difference that could most readily be used to make a difference. Studies of 
the other aspects of racial morphology were generally only needed to bolster 
later claims that racial hierarchy was somehow natural rather than simply 
politically expedient. 
The prevailing theoretical view of race in eighteenth-century Anglo-
America seems to have been something like what Samuel Stanhope Smith 
offered in his 1785 address to the American Philosophical Society (which 
was later published as An Essay on the Causes of the Variety of Complexion 
and Figure in the Human Species in 1787). Rev. Smith claimed that there was 
but one original human pair from which all living persons are descended, 
and that pair was white.32 Some of their progeny, however, migrated to 
lands where the environmental conditions changed their skin, giving rise 
to peoples of black, tawny, and yellow complexions that were inherited by 
successive generations. Smith was very familiar with European racial theories 
of his time and drew on them freely in his essay. His view differed from 
that of his contemporary Immanuel Kant in that Smith believed as races 
migrated into new lands, their pigmentation and other features would 
gradually alter further, according to climate; Kant, of course, believed that 
once the original "germs" had matured into racial types, people of each 
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type lost the ability to produce children with features carried by the other 
germs, so races were now fixed regardless of the climate inhabited. 
Smith's monogenetic view of the etiology of race prevailed in North America 
for about fifty years. By that point it was clear that dark-skinned people were 
not lightening, light-skinned people were not darkening, and neither Euro-
peans nor Africans were turning tawny, olive, yellow, or red like the native 
groups (depending on which observer one consults). By the 183os, with the 
work of Charles Caldwell (Thoughts on the Original Unity of the Human Race, 
1830) and Samuel George Morton (Crania Americana, 1839), Anglo-American 
thinking began to change dramatically; by 1851 Morton was openly declaring 
what he had only implied twelve years earlier, namely, that each of the five 
races (he held there were five, as did Blumenbach, but this was subject to 
debate; Kant had said there were four) were separate species with separate 
origins.33 Although Morton's work was controversial-in part because it 
contradicted the idea that species could be distinguished on the basis of 
whether cross-progeny were fertile, which clearly mulattoes and mustees 
were34- from midcentury on, polygenist views held sway in the United States, 
finding voice and reinforcement in the work of George Gliddon, Josiah Nott, 
and Louis Agassiz. 35 
Samuel Stanhope Smith's work coincides with the beginning of the 
national debate about whether to abolish slavery. At that point, according to 
Michael Banton, "Only a handful of pro-slavery writers asserted that blacks 
were inferior; most pointedly rejected such views except in so far as they 
contended that only Negroes could work in extreme heat."36 (It is not self-
evident that heat tolerance is a sign of inferiority; in this age of perforated 
ozone, heat and sun tolerance may be the trait that marks those fittest for 
survival. But Thomas Jefferson among others suggested that this trait in 
the Negro indicated fitness for manual as opposed to mental labor. 37) Slave 
traders' testimony in parliamentary inquiries on the subject amounted to 
"detailed information which revealed mistrust and ethnocentric contempt 
but no assumptions about permanent superiority and inferiority."38 The 
debate was not primarily over whether Africans were inferior to whites but 
over whether enslavement of human beings was morally permissible. Smith's 
essay was often used by abolitionists as a foundation for arguments against 
slavery. In 1810, two years after abolition of the slave trade, Smith's essay was 
reprinted, so it was still enjoying wide popularity, but the days of monogeny's 
ascendancy in the United States were numbered. The subsequent rise of 
polygeny theory coincided with a period in which the only legal way to increase 
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the slave population was to impregnate African American women. Black 
men could be used for that purpose, but very often slave owners took the 
duty on themselves or delegated it to their sons-which of course meant 
that large numbers of enslaved individuals in the years following r8o8 were 
of European as well as African descent. As the actual hereditary lines between 
Americans of varying pigmentation became indistinct, the theoretical bio· 
logical lines between American races were sharpened. 
Following the abolition of racial slavery in r863 and the conclusion of the 
Civil War in r865, a new era began in the United States, especially in the 
once politically dominant South. While the imperialistic nations of Europe 
were honing their management skills in the creation of technological bureauc-
racies, the United States was trying to build an economy virtually from the 
ground up. Except for a few cities like Richmond where negotiation prevented 
outright razing, the South's urban infrastructure and transportation system 
was utterly destroyed by fire, looting, and four years of violence and neglect. 
Much of the labor force was displaced. Thousands of former slaves simply 
marched along behind the liberating armies for lack of any idea where to go 
or what to do; military leaders managed to feed and resettle some of them, but 
many were left without any provision at all. One out of every four white South-
ern males above the age of twelve had died in battle or of starvation, exposure, 
or disease between r86r and r865. In fields outside Petersburg, Virginia, alone, 
thirty thousand bodies lay scattered; most would never be identified. 
There is no economy without a labor force. But within the defeated Con-
federacy most of the laborers in r865 were either displaced or dead, and 
those who remained or could be rounded up were destitute, unruly, largely 
unskilled, and filled with high expectations and intense fears and suspicions. 
This posed a huge administrative problem, but it also presented a variety of 
interesting opportunities. In any case, the South constituted an enormous 
laboratory for experimentation in the management of populations, which set 
the North American stage for the widespread development of what Foucault 
calls "biopower." 
Biopower 
The science of life aided two parallel governmental developments, which 
Foucault describes in both part V of The History of Sexuality, vol. r, and 
"Society Must Be Deftnded." The first is that of normalizing disciplinary 
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control of individuated bodies, familiar to readers of Foucault's Discipline 
and Punish. Normalizing discipline takes shape in the late eighteenth century 
in response both to increasing numbers of individuals requiring manage-
ment in institutions like the military, schools, hospitals, and factories and 
to the requirements of technological innovations in mechanized production 
and weaponry. This Foucault calls "an anatomo-politics of the human body" 
(Foucault, 1980, 139). The second governmental development, which began 
to take shape in the nineteenth century, "focused on the species body, the 
body imbued with the mechanisms of life and serving as the basis of the 
biological processes: propagation, births, and longevity, with all the conditions 
that can cause them to vary" (139). This involved a series of interventions and 
regulatory controls, as opposed to normalizing disciplines. Foucault terms 
this "a biopolitics of the population" (139). These two poles of development in 
governmental practice and institutional power structures constituted "an 
explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation 
ofbodies and the control of populations, marking the beginning of an era 
of 'bio-power"' (140). As European nation-states become modem techno-
logical bureaucracies, biopower emerges and extends its reach through groups 
now defined as populations. It justifies itself and broadens its purview on 
the basis of its claim to manage life processes (health) at the level of the 
social body. Its institutions and practices purport to work for the good of 
the people, its subjects, as a collective mass. Government's job becomes not 
simply defending and perhaps enlarging the sovereign's territory and wealth 
but, and much more important, protecting and strengthening the nation, 
conceived as a people or race. 
Biopower is Foucault's word for the mechanisms and institutions, policies 
and procedures, that officials created in pursuit of that goal. These have 
included such things as programs for public hygiene, mandatory inoculation 
or quarantine, "managed" health care, insurance regulation, campaigns to 
promote marriage and fertility or to achieve zero population growth or put 
an end to the consumption of dangerous substances (from alcohol to mari-
juana to tobacco), state regulation of reproductive technology, institutional 
efforts to improve the public morals, public surveillance to reduce crime 
or prevent masturbation or identifY bioterrorists, and on and on. The main, 
or at least the ostensible, point of such efforts is to strengthen the nation 
considered as a living population rather than as individuals, so that restric-
tions on liberty for individuals are considered to be largely justified. But the 
issue is not so much what people decide to do and how to entice them to do 
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what meshes with the aims of power structures; the issue is, at least very 
often, who people are, what deviant groups they belong to or identify with. 
Deviance may weaken the nation; pathology, perversion, and all forms of 
degeneracy contaminate it and threaten its life. The state has become the 
great administrator of the national bios, which means that it must act as the 
great divider, the mechanism for purifying the public body of contaminants 
by excluding or eliminating those "elements" that the body cannot health-
fully assimilate. 
What-or who-count as internal contaminants? In European nations 
answers could vary-in fact, answers have varied a great deal across national 
boundaries and over time. But it is no surprise that the usual suspects include 
the "idle," the poor, the sick, the criminal, and the stupid, as well as anyone 
else who refuses to adhere to the standards of productivity, hygiene, lifestyle, 
and reproduction set by the state. 
Morphological racism was already entrenched in most European societies 
in one form or another by the nineteenth century, so persons of races other 
than whatever was allegedly best (be it white, Caucasian, Saxon, Nordic, 
Aryan, etc.) were already members of an underclass, usually economically 
deprived and evincing the effects of that deprivation (illness, the filth of 
poverty, thievery and violence, illiteracy and ignorance, and so on). Entire 
morphologically defined races were easily subsumed into this new category 
of biological degenerates held responsible for the disease and corruption of 
an otherwise-healthy social body. As a thoroughly biologized concept, as a 
category of normalization, race came to operate as one way-but a major 
way-of identifying degenerates. Late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
studies of racial physiology dovetailed nicely with similar studies of the physi-
ology of criminals, alcoholics, morons, and sexual perverts. And all these social 
contaminants-physiologically defined and morphologically identified -could 
be held to be pathogens in the public body, and therefore enemies of the state. 
This was an especially valuable tool for European colonial administra-
tors who could, under the auspices of the authority of a state committed to 
enhancing life, kill thousands upon thousands of the people under their 
control. Without the new scientific theories of race as arrested development 
or deviance, a glaring contradiction would have threatened the authority 
and legitimacy of imperialistic national governments. If government's job 
is to maintain the health of populations, should it not treat its colonial pop-
ulations as groups in need of purification in relation to the motherland? If 
race had simply meant morphological difference, European administrators 
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should have taken the same approach to rooting out impurities-criminals, 
imbeciles, madmen, perverts-in the colonial territories as their counterparts 
did in Europe. Instead, the entirety of colonial populations were treated as 
biological threats to European peoples. Thus, Foucault asserts, the kind of 
racism that operates in the twentieth century, the kind we all grew up with 
and know from intimate experience, "first develops with colonization, or in 
other words, with colonizing genocide, If you are functioning in the biopower 
mode, how can you justifY the need to kill people, to kill populations, and to 
kill civilizations?" (2003, 257). Modem, scientific theories of race created a 
set of developmental distinctions that allowed colonial governments to 
exterminate their own colonial populations or deprive imported colonial 
workers of basic necessities, not to mention basic rights. Racism, Foucault 
writes, "is primarily a way of introducing a break into the domain oflife that 
is under power's control: the break between what must live and what must 
die" (258). It is a way of marking out, in biological terms, those individuals 
who pose an alleged threat to the corporate bios-that is, the life, health, 
strength, and longevity-of the nation (255). Hence state racism-which 
interlocks with scientific racism-is a virtual inevitability, Foucault insists, 
in a nation that constitutes itself by means of the techniques ofbiopower; 
to function and extend itself, biopower requires biologically based dividing 
practices that justify-in fact dictate-that some people will be sacrificed 
either by direct elimination from the population or by deprivation of vital 
resources. To protect its life, it will be argued, the population must be made 
secure against various internal (or annexed and internalized) contaminants. 
As we have seen in the previous section of this chapter, the United States 
(perhaps unlike European nations) practiced state racism from its incep-
tion. Racism-and not just racial slavery-was enshrined in its laws from 
the very beginning. 39 Our laws and governmental institutions have never 
been "color-blind," have never operated in the absence of racial dividing 
practices. If Anglo-America was perhaps a step ahead of Europe in producing 
a concept of race as heritable morphology, it may also have been at the fore-
front of the development of racist population management. 
In a U.S. context, we must make a distinction that Foucault does not make: 
we must distinguish between state racism and scientific racism (which came 
later and was used extensively by the state once it was articulated). But the 
basic distinction that Foucault draws still holds: there is a crucial difference 
between race conceived as heritable morphology and race conceived as heritable 
physiological functioning. The development of the latter concept-which 
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enabled the kind of administration of populations that now characterizes 
the industrialized West-required a major shift in scientific thinking, which 
Foucault locates at the tum of the nineteenth century with the demise of 
natural history (the rubric under which Kant's work on race clearly fits, as he 
himself adamantly asserts) and the rise of biology (the rubric under which 
Darwin's work and the work of the eugenicists following Galton clearly fit). 
State racism requires nothing more than some kind of racial dividing practice 
that enables oppression of one or more racially defined groups. Scientific 
racism -which I would agree with Foucault is what we today understand and 
experience as modem racism -amounts to a major expansion of the tools 
of state racism in nineteenth- and twentieth-century America. 
So Racism Is What? 
It is hard for any philosopher to resist the Platonic imperative to define every-
thing. I have argued here that, whatever else it might be said to be, racism is 
a dispositif, a vast apparatus of repeating, self-reinforcing power relations 
that emerges in the English-speaking world in the seventeenth century. It 
functions to divide people-first primarily laborer from laborer-and to 
apportion resources such as health care, insurance, police protection, edu-
cation, and personal wealth unequally. While it is true that racism requires 
the concept of race, it did not require a very precise or stable concept; as 
racism has evolved in conjunction with global economic and technological 
change, it has produced racial sciences that have given the world concepts 
of race different from those that enabled its initial founding. Neither race 
nor racism is a historical constant, much less a natural constant. 
I have argued, further, that the concept of race operative in modem racism 
is not primarily a morphological concept as it was in eighteenth-century 
racism, but is instead a physiological concept rooted in the nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century knowledges and practices that Foucault calls "normaliza-
tion." It is an aspect or type of development-or the lack, arrest, or deviant 
trajectory thereof. Thus it is almost impossible to classify people racially in 
the twentieth century without importing into that practice some presumption 
of abnormality or pathology. 
Racism persists regardless of whether the concept of race it employs is 
scientifically delineated, historically stable, or officially acceptable. It persists 
because it is the way that U.S. society was organized from its inception. But its 
persistence is not an indication that it is a permanent psychological (let alone 
RACISM AND BIOPOWER 79 
' biological) feature of human beings. Rather, its persistence is an indication 
that our society is deeply invested in maintaining economic inequality and 
extending the range and depth of mechanisms of social control. Racism has 
served these ambitions well for three hundred years. What all this means is 
that racism is not about to go away just because some geneticists have told 
us-and have been telling us since the 1940s-that our divisions of human 
beings into skin-color groups have no scientific basis. Racism can adapt to 
changes in the popular conception of what race is. If race comes to mean 
something like collections of statistical norms within larger gene pools that 
allegedly reproduce certain morphological and behavioral regularities in popu-
lations, racism can continue unabated. Recent moves to map many of societys 
so-called ills onto our genes-alcoholism, violent behavior, homosexuality, 
and so forth- testifY to the commodious nature of the concepts of physio-
logical racism. (I suspect that by the late 1940s U.S. racism was in fact already 
transforming and expanding, as genetic theory was gaining ground, to include 
these various kinds of deviant physiologies-which may be one reason why 
mid-century theorists like Sartre and Adorno saw racism as so multifaceted, as 
having so many target groups, and also as so stubborn.) 
What, then, shall we do? As Foucault points out, there is no outside to 
power, and biopower is the name of the game in our age. But just as Foucault 
taketh away-our belief in social progress, our belief in the fundamental 
autonomy of the individual-he also giveth. And what he giveth is the idea 
that power is never monolithic. For a regime of power to persist, millions of 
what he calls "capillary" relationships must persist unchanged-that is, they 
must repeat themselves-from day to day. And there is always the chance 
that they won't. 
We can enlarge that chance. We can disrupt capillary circuits of repetition. 
No, we can't hijack the whole system and make it fly at another altitude or 
crash it into the ground. There is no central control that we could comman-
deer. But each one of us can find points in the circulations of power that 
shape our lives where a refusal to act as we have in the past, an experimental 
move where before a habituated response would have been given, might begin 
to make a difference in our lives and the lives of those around us. Foucault 
refuses to give anybody a "right answer" to the question of what to do about 
any kind of injustice, but every word he ever wrote urges us to try. What 
emerges in history can disappear in history as well. Foucault was Nietzschean 
enough to believe that absolutely anything could-and would-one day be 
overcome. Progress is not inevitable, but change is. And what we do, con-
sciously or not, creates that change. 
8o ON RACE AND RACISM IN AMERICA 
What Philosophical Difference Any of This Makes or: 
Why This Is Philosophy and Not Just "Soft-Headed Girl Stuff" 
What have I done in this chapter besides recount the work that some excel-
lent U.S. historians have already done and relate it to some things a dead 
French guy once said about European history? Have I clarified a philosophical 
puzzle? Have I solved a philosophical problem? How can this enlargement 
on Foucault's work be construed as continental philosophy? 
Foucault's friend and colleague at the College de France Pierre Hadot 
describes Hellenistic philosophy not as a body of knowledge or even a method 
for producing and verifYing truth, but rather as a practice, a "way oflife.".w 
Philosophy, Hadot writes, was once something people did-and not just 
on occasion; it was something they did from dawn till dusk in everything 
that they undertook. It was a form of self-cultivation and self-governance. 
Foucault was very attracted by that idea, and so am I. I became a philosopher 
not because I wanted to solve puzzles but because I wanted to be better, in 
some indefinable way, than I was. 
Twenty years later "better" remains underdefined, but my desire persists. 
Now it is a desire to explore possibilities rather than reach some imagined 
goal like Platonic Beauty or Truth. As Foucault has said, "In what does [phi-
losophy] consist, if not in the endeavor to know how and to what extent it 
might be possible to think differently, instead oflegitimating [or attempting 
to realize] what is already known?"41 I want to think differently from how I 
have been taught to think, from how my racist, sexist society has constrained 
me to think. And this thinking differently is not a mere matter of changing 
my mind, restructuring or purifYing my system of beliefs. This thinking is 
a practice; it lives in the actions that I take and the way that I live. When I 
say I want to think differently, I mean I want to live differently, and that means 
dismantling old habits and developing new ways of behaving and moving and 
interacting and perceiving. I very strongly believe that that concerted effort to 
think-to act, to be-differently is philosophy. 
Genealogical exhumation of the ways our thinking was shaped, its pre-
decessors, its differences from its own past that it often tries to pass off as 
inevitabilities rather than options, can help us think differently. It can "free 
thought from what it silently thinks";4z it can break the intellectual, emotional, 
and behavioral bonds that hold us within a world shaped by the greed, the 
fears, and the desires of so many of our ancestors; it can estrange us from 
the habits and mores that heretofore seemed normal and therefore right. It 
can be a step toward becoming different people, people who can create a 
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future different from our past. As Grace Hale puts it, "American history in 
its broadest sense-what has happened, how we have represented to our-
selves what has happened, and how we will continue in this intersecting of 
making and telling-is vitally important here. If we understand the past 
as always having been only black and white, what will be the catalyst that 
makes the future different? the epiphany that erases the bloody divisions?"43 
Philosophy is about opening ourselves toward change, toward a future 
beyond what we are and know, a future that we do not dictate in advance. 
As such it is antithetical to the normalization and the management projects 
of our bioracist culture. Foucaultian genealogies, perhaps American-style, 
are tools we can use to effect some of those openings and, we may dare to 
hope, create a nonracist future. And this work of change (while neither 
hardheaded nor unambiguously masculine!) has absolutely everything to 
do with philosophy. 
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